Winning is keeping the target in constant sight…[1]
Background
In order to understand the influence of American cinema in the Second World War, it’s useful to return to the political and social situation in the country before the conflict. This context will allow us to better understand the challenges American filmmakers faced after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It’s a well-known fact that the United States had distanced itself from the war for a long time. As a result of the experience of the First World War, the society inclined to isolationism and or neutrality. The old continent had disappointed the Americans many and, as it turned out, not for the last time. Americans perceived Europe as a ‘growing racist ignoring the Treaty of Versailles and testing its military in the Spanish Civil War in 1936.’[2] The participation in the Great War, in which many American soldiers have lost their lives, was losing its meaning in the context of new threats and assurances of politicians that peace treaties would secure peace around the world proved as an illusion.
The reluctance of society to participate in international politics was also a result of the Great Depression which affected not only the United States but also most capitalist countries in the world in the 1930s. According to many historians, one of its consequences was Hitler’s rise to power. Despite the German aggression against Czechoslovakia and Poland, the prevailing belief of the American public was that a direct participation in another armed conflict wasn’t warranted and would disrupt the stability of the county.
According to data published at the Holocaust Museum website, in October 1939, 71% of Americans were against their country joining the war, and in 1940 – after Hitler’s invasion to Western Europe – this number rose to 93%.[3] Influential media personalities such as pilot Charles Lindbergh and popular ‘Radio Priest’ Charles Coughlin argued that the United States would fight an enemy better prepared for war and that Nazi Germany, as anti-interventionalists stressed, didn’t pose a direct threat to America.[4] Supporters of anti-war rhetoric also included some influential intellectuals such as culturologists Dwight MacDonald who published essays in the renowned magazine Partisan Review.
This stance was also supported by the Congress which in March 1939 declined Roosevelt’s proposal to amend the legislation to allow the sale of weapons to fighting countries. The President, who was convinced that sooner or later, the United States will have to join the fight, strived for the support of allies but without directly intervening into the conflict. It wasn’t until November 1941, after a series of deadly attacks by German submarines on the American Navy and merchant ships, that the US Senate passed a law lifting the ban on American ships entering ports in warzones. In consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States officially abolished the law on neutrality and entered the war.
Given the complex socio-political situation in the USA, it is no wonder that media propaganda, especially in radios and cinemas, played a crucial role in justifying America’s involvement in the war. It was necessary to convince average citizens to make sacrifices in the name of a conflict taking place far from American prairies, in foreign lands, in the name of a foreign cause. To this end, the military forces established a Morale Department whose task was to instil military values in soldiers. But when it turned out that training in the form of lectures didn't work and the soldiers’ morale was low, it turned its attention to the media.
The American government launched extensive plans to indoctrinate society through war films, radio programmes and information campaigns aimed at building a sense of threat from the Axis powers and convincing the public that joining the was essential to the security and interests of the United States.
Film as a tool of war
A propaganda programme was launched several months after the outbreak of the war. In July 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was established. Its structure was based in informing about American military goals and conveying ideals to domestic and foreign recipients that could lead to a peaceful and democratic atmosphere after the war.[5]
From the perspective of a contemporary viewer, especially from Central and East Europe, who is familiar with propaganda institutions, the foundation of OWI seems like a logical consequence of events. But in the United States, its activities were controversial. Suspicions arose both from politicians and generals. There was also considerable opposition from the public who didn’t trust a centralised agency as the only source of information about the conflict. The Republicans accused Roosevelt of using the OWI for his election campaign while general Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton and Walter Bedell Smith accused the Office’s founders of circumventing military censorship.[6]
Despite this tension, the organisation remained active until 1945. Its important part was the Bureau of Motion Picture (BMP). Its key tasks included setting up guidelines for making films supporting democratic ideas and directed against Nazi ideology. The BMP also collaborated with leading Hollywood filmmakers and studios, revising and assessing film scripts. But its authority reached beyond simple monitoring of film industry standards. Its film department made various instructional and documentary films, including one of the most important American propaganda series of the Second World War, Why We Fight (1942 – 1945) by Frank Capra.
The production of war films took place not only in main Hollywood studios such as Warner Bros, Paramount and Walt Disney, but also within military structures collaborating with film studios. One of the most important units was the First Motion Picture Unit belonging to the US Army Air Force. It consisted exclusively of professional filmmakers and produced more than 400 propaganda and education films. Its members included prominent actors and directors such as Clark Gable, William Holden, Clayton Moore, Ronald Reagan and John Sturges. The main tasks of the unit included training of combat operators and production of instructional films which played a crucial part in the army. The importance of these materials is well explained by the statement by one of the officers about a film showing the differences between American fighter P-40 and Japanese Mitsubishi A6m Zero: ‘The P-40 and Japanese Zero are so similar that it’s difficult to tell them apart at first glance. It was therefore important for our pilots to learn to identify the planes immediately. So we made a film in which, to maintain credibility, we used footage of a captured Japanese Zero. We highlight the important features of both planes so that even rookies could be sure when identifying Japanese fighters.’[7] Another important unit in production of war films was the U.S. Army Signal Corps. This unit made over 2500 films during the war, including John Huston’s acclaimed documentary The Battle of San Pietro (1945).[8] The U.S. Army Signal Corps not only documented combat operations but also recorded Nazi crimes during the liberation of concentration camps, providing invaluable historical materials. The Naval Photographic Unit (NPU) and U.S. Marine Corps also played an important part in making propaganda films.
The extent of the U.S. Army’s film production significantly exceeded the film production of other Allies. In addition to propaganda and instructional films, it also included film chronicles informing the public about the course of the war. Just like today, however, the most valuable footage was the footage filmed during combat operations used for strategic purposes.
To get high-quality footage from the battlefield and conduct large-scale propaganda, it was necessary to significantly improve film technology. Military laboratories researched innovations such as modernisation of film equipment, development of flashbulbs and using photography and film as a tool for analysing the effectiveness of bombing. Already at the beginning of the war, the Military Committee was established to set technical standards for individual branches of the military. The committee discussed global distribution of propaganda films, operation of battle cameras and the operation of the military film programme. Based on the committee’s decision, portable and lighter 16mm cameras were introduced in 1944, replacing the standard 35mm cameras. As Andrew Tarantola notes, the war was an impulse to strengthen the cooperation between the Army and the film industry which led to significant technological development. Examples include companies such as Kodak and Bell and Howell which by the end of the war focused most of their production on military needs. Alice Lovejoy points out that Bell and Howell supplied the Army with optical and camera equipment worth more than 100 million Dollars.[9]
Myth-building strategies
When analysing the American war propaganda in the 1940s cinema, we need to take into account that although it was carried out on many fronts and its objectives changed as the conflict developed, its main mission was to discredit the ideology of enemy states and weaken the morale of their citizens. The general strategy involved undermining the values used as foundations of the Axis powers thus limiting their capability to wage war.[10] Films made within this framework were supposed to not only inform the American public but also demonise and ridicule enemies. Their strategic effectiveness depended on the coordination of many factors that had to be synchronised within a given timeframe in order to achieve the intended effect. A remarkable, if not entirely typical, is Frank Capra’s documentary Know Your Enemy: Japan showing the complexity of establishing propaganda goals and methods. The film was originally supposed to increase the awareness of Japan among American soldiers, but it ended up portraying the Japanese as aggressors, Emperor Hirohito as a politically impotent fanatic and the Japanese culture as militant. Due to the uncertainty over the US Government’s stance on the Asian country and discord among the film crew, the production was halted several times and the premier postponed to 1945, shortly after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This delay significantly affected the film’s propaganda effect and ultimately led to its withdrawal from distribution.[11]
An essential part of the American film campaign was also the effort to reflect and influence public opinion towards Germany. One of the most significant anti-German films of the Second World War is Mrs. Miniver (dir. William Wyler, 1942) about which Joseph Goebbels remarked that there is not a single hateful word uttered against Germany in the film, yet its anti-German tendency is flawless.[12] Not only was the film a huge box-office success and attracted wide audiences, but it also won several Oscars including the award for the Best Picture. The depiction of ordinary Brits in a difficult wartime situation helped American viewers to better empathise with innocent victims and bolstered the support of Allies shortly before the United States officially entered the war. The film’s fans included Winston Churchill, who wrote in his review for Variety that the film did more for the war effort than a fleet of destroyers.[13] A substantial and effective propaganda strategy was also represented by period film newsreels which became more defensive and dynamic as the was progressed. In response to German Die Deutsche Wochenschau chronicles, United News produced 267 film chronicles between 1942 and 1946, each opening with the American eagle with massive talons and wings spread wide, filling the entire screen. This symbol, referring to the American national symbol, was a counterpoint to the Third Reich eagle – one of the key symbols of Nazi propaganda. It became a metaphor for American strength, fight and victory. As Philip Burton Morris emphasises: ‘The chronicles taught the audiences to crave the drama of complex war operation while at the same time offering the desired happy ending – the unquestionable triumph of American good against the forces of evil.’[14] On the other hand, the idea of brotherhood and a common future for nations was a response to the German slogan ‘divide and conquer.’ Documentary and live-action films alike emphasised the role of the Allies, especially Great Britain – a country that shared similar goals and motivations for fighting as well as family ties (Know Your Ally: Britain, dir. Walter Huston, 1944). The Czechoslovak Republic was also portrayed in a positive light – as a small country in Central Europe with deeply rooted democratic traditions (Hangmen Also Die, dir. Fritz Lang, 1943), and, for strategic reasons, so was the Soviet Union whose support was invaluable to the Americans.[15] As the image of individual countries in propaganda films was based on everchanging political circumstances, not all Allies were portrayed equally favourable. Poles appeared less frequently in American films and their portrayal was sometimes simplified or distorted, which was, among other things, a consequence of their tense relations with the USSR (In Our Time, dir. Vincent Sherman, 1944).[16]
An important element of propaganda, in line with the doctrine of brotherhood, was also the controlled presentation of ethnic diversity – a response to the Nazi idea of the superiority of the Aryan race. Although American documentary and live-action films focused mainly on young white soldiers, the recommendations of the Office of War Information emphasised that the United States are a country of many races and religions that could live together and develop.[17] The most famous example of the implementation of this idea is the documentary The Negro Soldier (dir. Stuart Heisler, 1944) which was supposed to encourage African Americans to enlist in the army and refute the accusations of American racism by enemy states. Although racism in the US was a serious problem in the 1940s, this film represented a breakthrough in the representation of African American in American filmography.[18]
Although these films were originally intended to fulfil educational goals, from the beginning of America’s entry to the war, they presented the situation at the front selectively, focusing mainly on such content that would win public support for the government’s war rhetoric. This way, American propaganda contributed to creation of the ‘Good War’ myth – a just and good war in which the American soldier fights for the freedom of an oppressed nation and becomes a guarantee of peace and security in the world. A significant role in building this myth was played by censorship. During the first years of the conflict, all footage of wounded and dead and scenes of terror were deleted. The OWI took into account that the public should be informed about war casualties, and the government primarily sought to present the conflict in a positive way. As late as 1942, the films still showed images of bloodless battles and brutal scenes were mostly recounted in the narrator’s commentary. Such censorship strictness – implemented by means of various mechanisms including the Hays Codex – meant that soldiers had a very limited idea of war. Military training may have provided them with practical knowledge, but the propaganda content significantly influenced their thinking and expectations. However, due to rising public discontent and tension between Hollywood and the government, the OWI and the Federal Bureau of Censorship began to allow more realistic scenes of violence, especially in film chronicles, starting in 1943. Gradually, films began to include footage of war atrocities but always accompanied by a narration with an optimistic conclusion. An example representing the aspect of returning to normal life after the war is the documentary Diary of a Sergeant (dir. Joseph M. Newman, 1945) depicting the lives of war invalids trying to find their place in civil life.[19]
It's interesting that the myth of the Good War primarily revolved around men. As Anna Froula points out, the creators of film propaganda often overlooked the true contribution of women in the conflict, attributing stereotypical gender roles and romantic narratives to them. The marginalisation of women contributed to the mythologisation of ‘boys in uniforms’ and strengthening of a male archetype of a warrior fighting for a just cause.[20] The typical heroine of films made during that time was an innocent nurse, good wife or a sensual girl in an elegant uniform in the background of a conflict. In documentaries, just like in productions by other allied countries, women were most often depicted as workers of armament factories, as evidenced for example by Women on the Warpath (dir. Walter Anthony) from 1943. The films present female characters as capable of taking on ‘male’ jobs, but still with an emphasis on preserving traditional femininity and the expectation of returning to their original place after the war. As American culture saw female soldiers as a threat to the male military identity and social norms, their stereotyping was intentional and aimed at alleviating the society’s fears of disrupting traditional roles and blurring gender boundaries. There were, of course, exceptions such as So Proudly We Hail (dir. Mark Sandrich, 1943) depicting the war mission of nurses in the Philippines. The film was made only 13 months after the conclusion of the war campaign, when real nurses who participated in the fight for the Philippines were still held captive by the Japanese. The film, maintaining a sense of realism, presented its heroines as strong personalities who weren’t just passive witnesses of the events, but actively participated in the fight. However, the legitimisation of the role of women in the war appeared only rarely in American propaganda and what has been imprinted in the cultural memory are the photographs of ‘Penelope waiting,’ a nostalgic fantasy to which women succumb as supporters of the American Army.[21]
Although the topic of film propaganda in the US is extensive and cannot be covered in one text, it’s worth mentioning one more propaganda motif created during the Second World War. Commissioned by the OWI, the documentary series Projections of America aimed to improve the image of the United States on the international scene and particularly in Europe. These films represented a counterweight to dominant Hollywood films of the 1930s – crime films and westerns depicting America as a land of lawlessness in crisis. Although the series was not widely distributed in America itself, it enjoyed wide international distribution. It dealt with themes such as the openness of Americans to other nations (The Cummington Story, dir. Helen Grayson, Larry Madison, 1945), the successes of the military industry and the positive image of a soldier (Autobiography of a Jeep, dir. Irving Lemer, Joseph Krumgold, 1943), as well as the hard work of ranchers and their adherence to traditional values (Cowboy, 1943).[22] The series of 26 short documentaries constructed an image of America as a democratic country solidly with the war effort. This positive image also fit in the popular Allies narrative of ‘the People’s War.’ According to this idea, class differences almost disappeared, giving way to a democratic spirit of community and collegiality. In this context, the individual hero typical for film noir was replaced by the collective heroism of soldiers and civilians from various backgrounds, uniting patriotism and courage.[23]
Conclusion
As apparent, American propaganda was a complex tool combining political, social and military goals whose influence reached far beyond mere entertainment and information. All these films represented a significant part of the Allied narrative during the war and their influence is apparent to this day. They also served as a mechanism of forming a collective memory of the conflict. The myth of the ‘good war’ stemming from these films survived long after the war had ended and affected the way coming American generations perceived the war and the role of America in the world.[24] As Peter Soderbergh states: ‘Twenty-two years and several wars later, two hundred million Americans know the reality of war only through films. Wars have become ideological and painfully complex. Films teach us to relive the idyllic years of the Second World War when Hollywood thought it understood the simple nature of our crusade.’[25]
We need remember, however, that already in the 1940, there were some critical voices among renowned film critics such as James Agee who drew attention to the superficiality, distortion of facts and the instrumental use of films as tools of propaganda.[26] The process of demythologisation of the images present in these films continues in the humanities to this day. It is difficult to objectively estimate the influence of these films on the actual course of the conflict, but their distribution was very well planned.
By the end of the war, the American Army had the most extensive network of film distribution in the world: ‘Film reels were being delivered to Allied units on all continents by planes, ships, trains, automobiles, motorcycles and even camel caravans and arctic dog teams.’[27] This extent, in combination with propaganda activities by other Allies was so effective that in 1945, while declaring Germany’s unconditional surrender, Third Reich Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel stated: ‘We had everything perfectly calculated, except the speed with which Allies were able to train their people for war. Our biggest mistake was to underestimate their rapid and complete mastery of film education.’[28]
Iwona Łyko-Plos
Notes:
[1] Paul Virilio, War and Cinema. The Logistics of Perception. London – New York: Verso 1989.
[2] Kristof Grabmayer, US-American Propaganda in World War II. Online, Diploma Thesis. Am Institut für Amerikanistik Begutachtet von Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Walter W. Hölbling: Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz 2013. Available at: https://unipub.uni-graz.at/obvugrhs/content/titleinfo/231703/full.pdf. [Quoted 2025-05-05].
[3] How did Public Opinion About Entering World War II Change Between 1939 and 1941? Online. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Available at: https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/americans-and-the-holocaust/us-public-opinion-world-war-II-1939-1941. [Quoted 2025-05-04].
[4] See From Arsenal to Ally: The United States Enters the War. Online. In: The National WWII Museum. Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/arsenal-ally-united-states-enters-war. [Quoted 2025-05-08].
[5] See Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, What to Show the World: The Office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942–1945. The Journal of American History 64, 1977, no. 1, pp. 87–105.
[6] See Edward Fischer, Review, Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942–1945. The Review of Politics 40, 1978, 40, no. 3, pp. 406–408. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406569.
[7] R. William McGee, Cinematography Goes to War. Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers 42, 1944, 42, no. 1, p. 103, translation Iwona Łyko-Plos.
[8] Susan Thompson, Communicating and training through film: an Army Signal Corps innovation. Online. U.S. Army. 2022. Available at: https://www.army.mil/article/260238/communicating_and_training_through_film_an_army_signal_corps_innovation. [Quoted. 2025-05-30]; Noteworthy is also the close cooperation of the United States Army Signal Corps with Astoria Studios, a renowned East Coast studio responsible for pre-war blockbusters starring for instance Rudolph Valentino and Gloria Swanson. While Hollywood dominated the West, Astoria represented a crucial film production centre in the East which facilitated cooperation with military and government institutions in New York and Washington D.C. The cooperation of the US Army with Astoria Studios continued to the 1970s.
[9] See Andrew Tarantola, Hitting the Books: Smaller cameras and projectors helped the Allies win WWII. Online. Engaged. 2021. Available at: https://www.engadget.com/hitting-the-books-everyday-movies-haidee-wasson-university-of-california-163046486.html. [Quoted 2025-06-27].
[10] See Benno Nietzel, Knowing the Enemy: Propaganda Experts, Intelligence, and Total War (1941–1945). Online. KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge 4, 2020, 4, no. 2, pp. 203–230. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/710328. [Quoted 2025-07-03].
[11] See Know Your Enemy: Japan. Online. AFI CATALOG. Available at: https://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-97-27mpg780. [Quoted 2025-06-06].
[12] See Mrs. Miniver. Online. In: Wikipedia: the free encyclopedia. San Francisco (CA): Wikimedia Foundation 2001. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mrs._Miniver. [Quoted 2025-07-01].
[13] Ibid.
[14] Philip Burton Morris, Reel War: The Evolution of the American War Film. Online. Warfare History Network. Available at: https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-american-war-film-from-sands-of-iwo-jima-to-flags-of-our-fathers/. [Quoted 2025-06-25].
[15] It’s worth to mention the film Mission to Moscow (dir. Michael Curtiz, 1943), which was filmed at the request of President Roosevelt and is an adaptation of the memoirs of Joseph E. Davies, American Ambassador in the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1938. The film, depicting the Soviet Union in a positive light during the era of Stalin’s terror, is still controversial today.
[16] See M. M. B. Biskupski, Hollywood's War with Poland, 1939–1945.University Press of Kentucky 2010.
[17] See Matthew Sitter, Violence and Masculinity in Hollywood War Films During World War II. Diploma Thesis. Thunder Bay, Ontario: Lakehead University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Department of History 2012.
[18] In order to better understand this issue, it’s worth familiarising oneself with the activities of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) which was founded in 1942 and supported the campaign of African Americans with the goal of symbolically achieving a double victory (‘V’), a victory over the countries hostile towards the United States and at the same time overcoming racism in the country.
[19] It’s also worth mentioning John Huston’s post-war film Let There Be Light (1946) which was made as the last in a series of documentaries made by the director during the course of his service in the Signal Corps during the Second World War. Although the film was made to educate the public about the post-traumatic stress disorder affecting war veterans, it was not released until the 1980s due to the way it portrayed the issue.
[20] See Anna Froula, From Militarized Femininity to Female Masculinity: Women Soldiers in American War Movies. Journal of War & Culture Studies, 2009 [online]. [Quoted 2025-06-05]. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/5542445/From_Militarized_Femininity_to_Female_Masculinity_Women_Soldiers_in_American_War_Movies
[21] Ibid.
[22] Connie Gentry, Projections of America: Introducing the American Way of Life Abroad. Online. 2011. Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/projections-of-america-propaganda. [Quoted 2025-06-16].
[23] SeeJames Chapman, The British at War. Cinema, State and Propaganda 1939–1945. London: I.B. Tauris 1998, p. 161.
[24] See Liz Mineo, How ‘Good War’ Wasn’t All That Good. West Point Scholar Argues ‘Hazy, Rosy’ Myth Shaped False Sense of U.S. Destiny. Online. Harvard Gazette, 2022. Available at: https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/01/why-world-war-ii-wasnt-all-that-good/. [Quoted 2025-06-10].
[25] Peter Soderbergh, The Grand Illusion: Hollywood and World War II, 1930–1945. University of Dayton Review 5, 1968, no. 3, p. 19. Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol5/iss3/3, Translation IŁ.
[26] James Naremore, The Cinema According to James Agee. New England Review 35, 2014, no. 2, pp. 100–115. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24243040.
[27] The Unwritten Record. How the U.S. Army Served its Movie-Mad GIs during World War II. Online. National Archives. 2020. Available at: https://unwritten-record.blogs.archives.gov/2020/01/09/how-the-u-s-army-served-its-movie-mad-gis-during-world-war-ii/. [Quoted 2025-06-28].
[28] Patricia Ward Biederman, Winning the war, one frame at a time. Online. Los Angeles Times. 2012. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-oct-30-et-biederman30a-story.html. [Quoted 2025-06.30].
